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Sentimentalizing and Legal Language: Affect and Emotion in 
Courtroom Talk  
Abstract 
In The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, the International Criminal Court tried the 
destruction of UNESCO World Heritage sites as a war crime for the first time. In this case, the 
value of things in relation to the value of persons became the central issue. Based on courtroom 
ethnography conducted during the proceedings and informed by affect and emotion research, 
this article identifies the rhetorical practice of sentimentalizing persons and things as an 
important process of legal meaning-making. Through sentimentalizing, all parties rhetorically 
produce normative arrangements of bodies by way of emotionally differentiating the relevant 
persons, things, and other entities from and affectively relating them to each other. 
Sentimentalizing provides an affective-emotional frame in which to determine the degree of 
guilt and innocence, justice and injustice.  
Keywords: International Criminal Court (ICC), The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, UNESCO World 
Heritage, courtroom ethnography, law and emotion, law and affect 
1. Introduction 
The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi is the first case to be tried before the International 
Criminal Court that dealt not with the killing of persons, but with the destruction of things. 
When insurgent troops from the north of Mali occupied the city of Timbuktu in 2012, the 
accused oversaw the destruction of ten mausoleums and the door of a mosque;1 all but one of 
these were listed as World Heritage sites by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
                                                 
1 The destroyed sites were: the Sidi Mahmoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit mausoleum (16th century); the Sheikh 
Sidi El Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammad Al Kabir Al Kounti mausoleum (19th century); the Sheikh Alpha Moya 
mausoleum (16th century); the Sheikh Mouhamad El Micky mausoleum (19th century); the Sheikh Abdoul 
Kassim Attouaty mausoleum (16th century); the Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi mausoleum (19th 
century); the door of the Sidi Yahia mosque (15th century); the two mausoleums adjoining the Djingareyber 
mosque, namely the Ahmed Fulane mausoleum and the Bahaber Babadié mausoleum (14th century); and the 
Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani mausoleum. All but the last mausoleum were listed by UNESCO as 
World Heritage sites. 




Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Al Mahdi was tried for war crimes according to art. 
8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. It was the shortest 
trial in the young Court’s history and, for the first time, the accused pleaded guilty and signed a 
plea-bargaining agreement with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP).2 On the day of the 
pronouncement of judgment and sentencing, the judges gave an account of the scope of the 
crime constituted by the destruction of these buildings:3 
 
Destroying the mausoleums, to which the people of Timbuktu had an emotional 
attachment, was a war activity aimed at breaking the soul of the people of Timbuktu. In 
general, the population of Mali, who considered Timbuktu as a source of pride, were 
indignant to see these acts take place. … [T]he entire international community, in the 
belief that heritage is part of cultural life, is suffering as a result of the destruction of the 
protected sites (JSH: 12).4 
 
The presence of emotion words in this passage is so striking that one cannot help but ask what 
role emotion and affect play in this case. Hundreds of people died in the Malian civil war of 
2012–2013, among them many civilians. Hundreds of thousands were displaced. Nevertheless, 
it was the destruction of these ten small one-story structures, built out of mud bricks, that found 
its way first into international news all over the world, then onto the floor of the United Nations 
Security Council, and finally into the courtroom of the International Criminal Court. The 
destruction of the mausoleums of Timbuktu, not the killing of civilians, triggered the first and 
(so far) only conviction regarding the conflict in Mali. There are many different reasons for this 
– some of them concerning the practical problems of investigating and prosecuting international 
                                                 
2 The proceedings consisted only of the initial appearance hearing on 30 September 2015, the confirmation of 
charges hearing on 1 March 2016, and a three-day trial from 22 to 24 August 2016. Judgment and sentencing 
were delivered on 27 September 2016. I visited the Court in The Hague and attended personally both the 
confirmation hearing and the trial proceedings. 
3 Apart from English, the participants in the proceedings spoke either French or Arabic. There was simultaneous 
translation into these three languages in the courtroom. Court transcripts are available in English and French. 
These documents contain verbatim transcriptions of what the participants said in either English or French and a 
translation into either English or French when the participants spoke in the respective other language or in Arabic. 
In the main text of this article, I always present an English translation of what was said in the courtroom. When 
people spoke in English, I quote from the English transcript. When people spoke in French, I present my own 
translation of the French transcript (not the transcription of the simultaneous translation in the English transcript, 
which is not always of sufficient quality). When people spoke in Arabic, I present the transcription of the English 
simultaneous translation (a court transcript in Arabic is not available). 
4 All quotations cited as ‘JSH’ are from the public transcript of the judgment and sentencing hearing on 22 August 
2016. ICC-01/12-01/15-T-7-ENG. 




crimes – and it would go far beyond the scope of this article to discuss them. This text is 
concerned with the legal meaning-making in which the relationship of persons to things, 
paramount in this case, is produced. My central argument is that what I call sentimentalizing 
persons and things lies at the centre of what the parties must engage in – either to make it 
plausible that Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, the destroyer of these mausoleums, must answer for 
his actions before the International Criminal Court, or to give grounds for his defence.  
As will become clear, I do not use the word ‘sentimentalizing’ in its colloquial sense, i.e., 
‘to treat, regard, or portray in a sentimental way’ (Stevenson 2010: 1622) or ‘to indulge in 
sentiment’ (Merriam-Webster 2003: 1134). In everyday language, ‘sentimentalize’ is generally 
understood to mean that a person uses heightened or even exaggerated emotional rhetoric to 
achieve a certain effect. Underlying this use of ‘sentimentalize’ is the idea that it would also be 
possible to speak without ‘sentimentalizing’, that is, without any emotion or affect, and in the 
presumably neutral atmosphere of the courtroom (and other legal contexts), that is how it should 
be. In this article, however, I am following the basic insight from social science research on 
affect and emotion that feeling and thinking are always interwoven, and that one cannot exist 
without the other (Burkitt 2014; Rosaldo 1984; Röttger-Rössler and Markowitsch 2009). It is 
my aim to show that the sentimentalizing of persons and things in the way I present it here is 
always present, in one way or the other, and is an integral part of legal meaning-making, even 
when the rhetoric used is not ‘emotional’ on the surface. 
There is a tradition of interdisciplinary legal studies that takes the role of emotion and affect 
in legal processes seriously (Abrams and Keren 2009; Bandes 2001; Bandes and Blumenthal 
2012; Bens and Zenker 2017; Maroney 2006). The law-and-emotion approach is united in 
criticizing the notion that – as an ideal – legal processes are free of emotion and affect. The ideal 
of the rational law is seen as being based on a theoretical foundation biased towards (mostly 
Western) rationalism and unable to stand up to rigorous empirical investigation. Instead of 
assuming or even striving for a law that is completely rational in its application, one should 
acknowledge and systematically explore the role of emotion and affect in legal processes. This 
article contributes to this strand of research. 
As we will see, the most important contentious question in The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi 
concerns the value of persons in relation to the value of things. Anthropologists are conscious 
of the fact that attributing personhood to humans as well as non-humans is an endeavor with 
important consequences (Freire de Andrade Neves 2017; Hirsch 2010; Jansen 2013). Actor-
network theory (Latour 2005) and the anthropology of ontologies (Castro 1998; Descola 2005; 
Kohn 2015) are largely based on this premise. The law, anthropologists have argued, is 




fundamental to distinguishing between and hence ‘making persons and things’ (Pottage and 
Mundy 2004). I believe that the process of sentimentalizing persons and things that I lay out in 
this article is key to understanding this process. 
The findings I present in this article are derived from courtroom ethnography I have 
conducted during the case proceedings.5 The main action that occurs in courtrooms can in very 
general terms be described as people talking to each other, and an analysis of how this is done 
has traditionally been at the heart of courtroom ethnography (Brenneis 1988; Conley and O'Barr 
2004; Danet 1980; Levi 1990; Mertz 1994). We have learned from the theorists of performative 
speech in the legal sphere (Austin 1962; Butler 1997; Derrida 1989) that what is said and done 
in the legal context not only linguistically represents the world, but that the language of law has 
significant performative power to create the structures of meaning through which the world is 
represented. Consequently, the trial (especially the criminal trial) can be analysed as a quasi-
theatrical performance (Cole 2009; Diehl et al. 2006; Ertür 2015; Reinelt 2006; Vismann 2011). 
In this performative space, actors engage in narrative storytelling, and to analyse legal 
courtroom performances it is fruitful to investigate thoroughly these narratives (Amsterdam and 
Bruner 2002; Brooks 2006; Cover 1983; Jackson 1988; White 1985).  
More specifically, I am interested in analysing what role affect and emotion play in 
courtroom rhetoric to make the speakers’ arguments appear plausible and believable. It is my 
argument that, in this case especially, the process of legal meaning-making cannot be properly 
understood without including how meaning in the legal process is constructed through 
sentimentalizing persons and things. I see sentimentalizing as a form of performative rhetoric 
that aims to qualitatively differentiate humans, things, and other entities through the attribution 
of emotions and to affectively position them in relation to each other. This approach implies that 
the relevance and value of the different entities in relation to each other are not pre-determined, 
but emerge in the process of sentimentalizing itself. To understand this phenomenon, I draw 
from two theoretical lines of thought: first, the anthropological research on the construction of 
emotion in discourse (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990), and second, some ideas that have come 
about in the course of the ‘turn to affect’ in the social sciences and the humanities (Clough and 
Halley 2007; Gregg and Seigworth 2010), which has also reached anthropology (Rutherford 
2016). 
                                                 
5 Legal ethnographers, anthropologists, and other social scientists have investigated what goes on in courtrooms 
for some time, be it in Western contexts (Bennett and Feldman 1981; Conley and O'Barr 1990; Greenhouse et al. 
1994; Merry 1990; Scheffer 2010; Yngvesson 1994), or non-Western or post-colonial contexts (Goldman 1993; 
Hirsch 1998; Messick 1992; Richland 2008). 




First, it is important to differentiate between affect and emotion. Affect can be seen as a 
phenomenon of feeling and sensing that emerges in the relationality of bodies (Scheve 2017; 
Slaby 2016). Following Spinoza, many affect theorists conceptualize the body not in biological 
terms, but more abstractly as every entity that affects and is affected (Massumi 1995). It is 
therefore not predetermined whether bodies are human or non-human, persons or things, objects 
or subjects – a theoretical idea that bears some similarity to actor–network approaches (Latour 
2004). I believe that talking about bodies in this sense helps us understand legal meaning-
making in a context in which the loss of things can be felt at least as intensely as the loss of 
human life. I also argue that thinking about the relationality of bodies as an important component 
of affective rhetoric on a semantic level is crucial for understanding sentimentalizing rhetoric. 
Emotions differ from affect in that they are characterized by various discrete qualities, 
while affect is often measured strictly in terms of intensity (Massumi 1995; Wetherell 2012: 57-
58). Love is a feeling qualitatively different from hate; they differ in ways that go beyond the 
mere attribution of strength or weakness of the feeling. Charging bodies (attackers and victims) 
with different kinds of emotions not only positions them in relation to each other in a certain 
way, but qualitatively differentiates them as different kinds of bodies. Sara Ahmed (2004) has 
described how by ‘sticking’ signs to bodies, emotions can be circulated through language and 
rhetoric – establishing what she calls an ‘affective economy’. The aspect of attributing emotions 
to bodies in the way I describe in this article is a strategy to make them ‘stick’ and position them 
in an affective-emotional arrangement of meaning. 
Drawing on the anthropology of emotions, the anthropology of affect, and the courtroom 
ethnography literature, the aim of this article is to show how sentimentalizing performances 
occur in the courtroom of the Al Mahdi proceedings. All of the parties involved – the 
prosecution, the defence, the representative of the victims, and the judges – engage in this 
affective and emotional meaning-making by charging bodies (persons as well as things) with 
emotions and relating them to one another in a certain way. To better understand the context of 
this courtroom talk, I will introduce some background on the armed conflict in Mali, the 
occupation of Timbuktu, and the criminality of the actions of the accused, Ahmad Al Faqi Al 
Mahdi, in destroying the mausoleums protected as UNESCO World Heritage sites. Then I will 
engage in an ethnographic description of the courtroom rhetoric during the legal proceedings 
before the ICC in The Hague to shed light on how the sentimentalizing of persons and things 
operates in practice. 




2. The Armed Conflict in Mali and the Destruction of the Mausoleums of Timbuktu 
In January 2012, violence broke out between forces of the national government in Bamako and 
insurgents in northern Mali. The international media painted the conflict as a struggle of 
Islamists to overturn the government in Bamako and erect a califate. While the increasing 
importance of identification with Islam in Mali is an important part of the story (Loimeier 2016; 
Soares 2006), to understand the conflict it is key to have a clear picture of the longstanding 
antagonism between Tuareg separatists in the north and the government in Bamako (Lecocq et 
al. 2013).  
Even before Mali’s independence in 1960, many Tuareg communities had struggled for an 
independent Azawad (a Tuareg homeland in the Sahara) that would include northern Mali and 
parts of Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. In the pursuit of this political project, Tuareg groups 
have undertaken several rebellions in northern Mali (Lecocq 2010). To a large degree, the 
violence in 2012 was the result of yet another Tuareg uprising against the Bamako government. 
The main actor in the rebellion was the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA), which had started mustering Tuareg separatists in October 2011. What added to this 
Tuareg rebellion, however, was the involvement of both international and local jihadist Salafist 
movements with ties to the Tuareg community, including Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda of the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Lecocq et al. 2013). While AQIM is seen as a ‘foreign organization’ 
in Mali (although for the Tuareg and their trans-Sahara project, such labels do not carry much 
meaning), Ansar Dine has a more localized history.6 In this field of actors, tribal loyalty and 
jihad are closely intertwined factors, and the differences between the different insurgency 
groups remain subtle and are dependent on shifting tribal, economic, and religious alliances 
(Lecocq 2013). 
In early 2012 the insurgents launched attacks on garrisons of the Malian army in the Sahara 
and had some military success, and by April 2012 the insurgents had occupied all major cities 
in the north, including Timbuktu. Azawad declared its independence from the southern part of 
Mali. But it soon became apparent that the mainstream Tuareg and the jihadist groups had very 
different visions of the future of the newly emerging state. This resulted in an internal conflict 
in northern Mali in which the Tuareg separatists of the MNLA began to fight against the jihadists 
of Ansar Dine, AQIM, and others. Beginning in July 2012, the United Nations Security Council 
                                                 
6 Ansar Dine was founded by Iyad ag Aghali, a key figure of the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s who had broken 
with the idea of national independence and favored greater integration with the global Muslim world. 




condemned the violence and finally authorized a military intervention.7 On 15 January 2013, 
France (the former colonial power in Mali) intervened militarily – after formally being invited 
to do so by the government in Bamako. In Opération Serval, 2,500 French soldiers took back 
the north of Mali from the armed groups. The one-year conflict in Mali displaced about 400,000 
people, and the resulting humanitarian crisis far surpassed that of any of the previous conflicts. 
Beginning in early April 2012, the two jihadist groups, Ansar Dine and AQIM, occupied 
Timbuktu for about ten months. In the early days of the occupation the leading body of the 
occupying forces approached Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, later accused before the ICC, and asked 
him to become head of the Hisbah, a morality brigade. Al Mahdi, at the time in his thirties, 
worked as a teacher and was considered an expert in Islamic law. He was a key figure in the 
occupation of the city for two reasons: not only was he ideologically close to AQIM and Ansar 
Dine but, more importantly, he was a local (unlike the leaders of the occupation), and it was 
hoped that he would be more trusted by the population of Timbuktu when the drastic new 
Islamic rules had to be implemented. 
The purpose of the morality brigade was to prevent vice and promote virtue according to a 
fundamentalist interpretation of sharia law. In a televised interview, which was shown during 
the confirmation of charges hearing, Al Mahdi explained what kind of ‘visible vices in the 
streets’ should be punished by the Hisbah in an effort to eradicate them: ‘not wearing the veil, 
revealing one’s physical appearance, gender mix, smoking, photos, posters showing, for 
instance, forbidden slogans’ (CoCH: 45–46).8 Playing music of any kind was also forbidden in 
Timbuktu during the occupation. The members of the Hisbah under Al Mahdi patrolled the 
streets, organized radio broadcasts, and preached on Fridays. It was also their task to announce 
and justify the sentences of the Islamic tribunal, usually by reading them out through a 
megaphone in public. Among those ‘visible vices’ to be eliminated, the Hisbah also counted a 
widespread local religious practice: visiting the mausoleums of Islamic saints that are scattered 
throughout the city.  
The mausoleums of Timbuktu are small, modest constructions made of mud bricks, no 
larger than a few square meters in area. They are built over the tombs of Islamic scholars who 
had distinguished themselves during their lifetimes through their intellectual and spiritual 
achievements. Believers often go to the mausoleums to pray and ask the dead ancestors for help 
                                                 
7 S.C.Res.2056, U.N.Doc. S/Res/2056 (Jul. 5, 2012); S.C.Res.2071, U.N.Doc. S/Res/2071 (Oct. 12, 2012); 
S.C.Res.2085, U.N.Doc. S/RES/2085 (Dec. 20, 2012).  
8 All quotations cited as ‘CoCH’ are from the public transcript of the confirmation of charges hearing on 1 March 
2016. ICC-01/12-01/15-T-2-Red2-ENG. 




and counsel. The buildings must be regularly maintained by crépissage, a process similar to 
roughcasting, during which people climb up the walls to manually plaster them with mud. This 
upkeep is conducted by masons who come from families that traditionally care for certain 
mausoleums. Community members assist the masons in their work, turning crépissages into 
public events with many participants. 
The worship of saints is considered an un-Islamic religious practice in Wahabi Islam – a 
mere superstition not rooted in the teachings of the Qur’an. In an effort to discourage people 
from praying to the deceased, Islamic law prohibits the building of structures on graves. Al 
Mahdi had been trying to discourage the people of Timbuktu from conducting religious practices 
at the site of the mausoleums for some time through his Friday sermons and radio broadcasts. 
After some time the decision was taken to destroy some mausoleums as a way of sending a 
powerful message to the locals regarding the new religious policy. Al Mahdi thoroughly 
researched which sites were most frequently visited by believers, wrote a Friday sermon in 
which the destruction was theologically justified, organized the tools for their destruction, and 
oversaw the operation, which took place from 30 June to 11 July 2012.  
This act of destroying the mausoleums brought a new dynamic into the conflict. 
Immediately after the attacks – on 12 July 2012 – the government in Bamako referred the 
situation to the International Criminal Court, which formally opened an investigation on 18 
September 2012. The UN Security Council referred explicitly to the destruction of the World 
Heritage sites in two resolutions in October and December 2012 and declared that ‘such acts 
may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute and that the perpetrators must be held 
accountable.’9 In January 2013, the ICC Chief Prosecutor submitted a report on war crimes in 
Mali in which the destruction of the mausoleums featured prominently. The report notes that 
‘The destruction of religious and historical World Heritage sites in Timbuktu appears to have 
shocked the conscience of humanity.’10 
Al Mahdi left Timbuktu with the occupying forces when French troops took back the city 
for the government in Bamako in January 2013. He was arrested by French forces in the desert 
of Niger in October 2014. In his confirmation of charges hearing in March 2015, Al Mahdi made 
a full confession as part of his a plea-bargaining agreement with the prosecution. The 
                                                 
9  U.N. S.C. Res. 2071 (2012); UN S.C. Res. 2085 (2012). 
10 The Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report, 13 January 2013, para. 157. See www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan2013.pdf 




proceedings, therefore, were short, and arguments exchanged referred generally to the degree 
of the accused’s guilt as a basis for his sentencing. 
3. The Destruction of Cultural Heritage as a War Crime 
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is quite limited. Art. 5(1) of the Rome 
Statute, the multilateral treaty that establishes the Court and determines the kinds of proceedings 
it can conduct, restricts the jurisdiction of the ICC to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’. There are currently only three kinds of criminal acts 
enumerated in the Rome Statute that meet this qualification: genocide (art. 6), crimes against 
humanity (art. 7), and war crimes (art. 8).11 In 2010 the member states of the Rome Statute 
agreed on the definition of a fourth crime, the crime of aggression (going to war against 
international law), but it applies only to ratifying states, and only a few member states have thus 
far ratified the amendment. 
Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute lists as a war crime ‘intentionally directing attacks 
against buildings dedicated to religion … [and] historic monuments … provided they are not 
military objectives’.12 The rule not to destroy religious buildings and historic monuments was 
already included in the first Hague Conventions in 1899 and was reaffirmed several times in 
multilateral treaties.13 There is also jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) relating to the bombardment and siege of Dubrovnik.14 
As one can see from the provision, the Rome Statute does not specifically define as a war 
crime the destruction of an item listed as a UNESCO World Heritage. The act only qualifies as 
                                                 
11 All articles not otherwise attributed refer to the Rome Statute. 
12 This provision only refers to the destruction of protected buildings in ‘armed conflicts not of an international 
character’, namely civil wars and other ‘irregular’ wars in which the fighting parties are not the armies of two or 
more warring states. Its mirror provision applicable in international armed conflicts (i.e., the ‘classical war’ 
between state armies) is Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute. 
13 Art. 27 (‘edifices devoted to religion’) and art. 56 (‘historical monuments’) of the Convention with Respect to 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 1899); art. 27 (‘buildings dedicated to religion’ and ‘historic 
monuments’) of Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 1907); art. 53 
(‘historic monuments ... or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples’) of the 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; art. 16 (‘historic monuments ... or places of worship 
which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples’) of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
14 Prosecutor v. Jokic, Judgment, IT-01-42/1, Trial Chamber, 19 Mar. 2004, at para. 51; Prosecutor v. Kordic and 
Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 17 Dec. 2004, paras. 359 et seq.; Prosecutor v. Strugar, IT-
01-42-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 31 Jan. 2005;  




a war crime if the World Heritage site includes a ‘building dedicated to religion’ or a ‘historic 
monument’ in the sense of Art. 8(2)(e)(iv). However, the ICTY decided in The Prosecutor v. 
Strugar and The Prosecutor v. Jokic that being listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site is a 
strong indicator that the site would also qualify as a ‘historic monument’ according to the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention.15 In its Al Mahdi judgment, the ICC has now 
strengthened this connection between the UNESCO list and the indication and qualification of 
such an act as a war crime. 
This is not unproblematic. Anthropological scholarship has shown that cultural heritage is 
the result of complex ‘fabrications’ in legal regimes (Murphy 2004). We know that, from an 
anthropological viewpoint, UNESCO’s engagement in cultural heritage is not merely that of a 
detached protector of humanity’s cultural values; UNESCO is in fact deeply involved in 
creating these values in the first place (Meskell and Brumann 2015). UNESCO protects only 
the ‘right kind of culture’ as determined by certain actors (Nielsen 2011). In the case of Mali, 
the inclusion of the sites on the UNESCO list in 1988 is the result of longstanding negotiations 
between the Malian political elites in Bamako and the international community about what has 
and what does not have cultural value (Joy 2012, 2016). 
4. Sentimentalizing Cultural Heritage and its Counter-Narratives 
In a criminal trial, it is most obvious that there are competing parties with different interests. 
The prosecution, the defence, and the representatives of the victims all engage in the same type 
of activity: they talk. But what they talk about and how they talk about it aim at describing 
different versions of the facts. The different actors in a criminal trial produce and construct 
reality by performing competing narratives of the events constituting and contextualizing the 
perpetrator’s criminal act in an effort to persuasively substantiate their claims. I argue that one 
important aspect of this performative meaning-making in the courtroom is connected to the 
deployment of affect and emotion in order to charge and arrange bodies in a certain way that 
sentimentalizes persons and things.  
4.1 The Prosecution: ‘Not a Crime of Stones’ 
The ICC’s chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, gave two opening statements during the 
proceedings, one in March 2016 during the confirmation of charges hearing and another at the 
                                                 
15 Additionally, the ICTY decided in The Prosecutor v. Prlic that buildings not listed as UNESCO World Heritage 
sites can also enjoy that protection if they have ‘great importance for the cultural heritage of peoples’. 




first day of the trial in August 2016. There are several levels of what I call sentimentalizing 
persons and things in her courtroom rhetoric.  
The first level of sentimentalizing is very clear and up-front from a linguistic point of view. 
Bensouda and the other members of the prosecution team use a number of emotion words to 
attribute certain emotions either to the attackers of the buildings or to the victims, whether they 
be the inhabitants of Timbuktu, the citizens of Mali, the inhabitants of the continent of Africa, 
or humanity as a whole. The attackers are described as ‘coldblooded’ (CoCH: 12), ‘callous’, 
and full of ‘destructive rage’ and ‘contempt for these buildings’ (CoCH: 13). The victims are 
attributed with such emotions as ‘desperation’, ‘despair’, ‘dismay’ (CoCH: 12), ‘shock’, ‘anger’ 
(CoCH: 15), ‘outrage’ (CoCH: 16), and ‘humiliation’ (Trial Day 3: 7).16 
Arlie Russell Hochschild (1979, 1983) has shown how all domains of life are governed by 
feeling rules – propositions regarding how people should feel in certain situations and contexts. 
Feeling rules go beyond mere display rules – the idea that it is inappropriate to show certain 
emotions in certain contexts. Feeling rules are not only about what emotions one is expected to 
express, but what emotions one is expected to feel. When the prosecution attributes certain 
emotions to different bodies (in this case the victims and the attackers), they do so in the context 
of the implicit feeling rules that apply to an international criminal trial (although these specific 
feeling rules might not be accepted or shared by all participants in the same way). These rules 
are implied and at the same time created by the rhetoric of the parties. By feeling, expressing, 
and acting on contempt, hate, or rage against mausoleums that are important to other people, the 
attackers of the mausoleums violated these implicit feeling rules. One should feel respect, 
humility, or even admiration.17 Victims, on the other hand, who are dismayed, shocked, and 
angered about the destruction of their cultural heritage, are in complete accord with the implicit 
feeling rules. Attributing certain qualitatively different emotions to bodies in such a way that 
some bodies appear to be in accordance with feeling rules and others do not is a way of arranging 
these bodies in a normative way. Their feelings and actions appear either justified or unjustified. 
A second level of sentimentalizing regards specifically the non-human bodies – the 
buildings itemized on the UNESCO World heritage list – which play a major role in the case of 
Al Mahdi. They are the bodies violated, and to determine the degree of Al Mahdi’s guilt, it is 
                                                 
16 All quotations cited as ‘Trial Day 3’ are from the public transcript of the third day of the trial proceedings on 24 
August 2016. ICC-01/12-01/15-T-6-ENG. 
17 In other contexts, feeling rules are different. From the perspective of the jihadist groups, the appropriate feelings 
against the mausoleums might be contempt and righteous indignation in light of the religious abomination they 
represent. 




crucial rhetorically to position them in the right place. When it comes to these kinds of bodies, 
the prosecution did not attribute emotions to them semantically – that is, through the use of 
emotion words. Rather, they attributed emotions to the buildings by way of metaphor and 
metonymy. 
On numerous occasions, the chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, described the destroyed 
buildings in metaphorical terms: the mausoleums ‘embodied Timbuktu’s image and identity’ 
(CoCH: 15); they were the ‘lifebloods’ of the Malian people (CoCH: 15-16) and ‘very important 
to the hearts of people’ (Trial Day 1: 16); they represented a  ‘living testimony to Timbuktu’s 
glorious past’ (Trial Day 1: 17), ‘the embodiment of Malian history’ (Trial Day 1: 17), and a 
‘living symbol of the city’ (Trial Day 1: 19).18 Speaking more generally about the nature of 
cultural heritage, Bensouda explained that ‘our ancestors’ have ‘put their hearts and their souls 
into the creation of such cultural heritage’ (Trial Day 1: 19). She also asserted that all 
international crimes, including the destruction of cultural heritage, have one common 
denominator, namely that ‘they inflict irreparable damage on the human person in his or her 
body, mind, soul, and identity’ (CoCH: 12).  
In these descriptions there is a striking prominence of metaphors that refer directly to the 
biological body (‘body’, ‘embodied’, ‘incarnation’, ‘lifeblood’, ‘hearts’) or at least to living 
things, painting them as animate rather than inanimate bodies. Emotion research in the social 
sciences has highlighted the importance of metaphorical and metonymical speech for 
emotionalizing discourses (Ahmed 2004; Burkitt 2014; Hochschild 2016; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980). When speakers use metaphorical language that refers directly to the physical or biological 
body, listeners are reminded of embodied experiences that are connected to certain emotions 
(Kövecses 2000).19 
When we read metaphor as a means of sentimentalizing persons and things (hence 
qualitatively differentiating and relationally positioning bodies), an additional normative aspect 
becomes important: the act of describing the destroyed objects as living rather than as inanimate 
bodies arranges them closer to the human bodies involved in the proceedings. This links the 
                                                 
18 All quotations cited as ‘Trial Day 1’ are from the public transcript of the first day of the trial proceedings on 22 
August 2016. ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG. 
19 Based on insights from linguistic studies on how certain forms of language such as metaphor (but also grammar 
(e.g., syntax), word combinations, ideophones, etc.) can be conveyed through language, a growing field of 
research is developing in computing. In what is called ‘sentiment analysis’, natural language use is analysed, 
typically in ‘big data’ settings (Liu 2010; Ravi and Ravi 2015; Taboada et al. 2011). Although such research is a 
very different endeavour in many ways from the one I undertake in this article, some of the underlying 
assumptions about the interplay of discourse and emotions are similar. 




destruction of the things more immediately to the human victims of the crime. The prosecution 
tries rhetorically to arrange the destroyed non-human bodies and the involved human bodies in 
a way that they appear similar, close, and inextricably bound up with one another.  
A third level of sentimentalizing prevalent in the prosecution’s speech is analytically 
further away from traditional emotion research and comes closer to affect theory. On this level, 
the analytical focus is not on the use of emotion words or certain metaphorical language, but on 
the way bodies are semantically arranged and related to each other. In his closing remarks, the 
senior trial lawyer for the OTP, Jean Dutertre, summarized the relationship of the people of 
Timbuktu to the destroyed structures: 
 
As Madam Prosecutor said to you in her opening statement, heritage is not a luxury item; 
it is not superfluous. Heritage is part of who we are; it is an extension of ourselves. Its 
destruction transforms us into travelers without any belongings, into beings without soul, 
history, or memory. The ten sites in Timbuktu that were targeted, attacked, and destroyed 
were an incarnation of the city and closely linked to the life of the inhabitants (Trial Day 
3, French: 7).20 
 
This statement also has some sentimentalizing metaphors (‘incarnation’), but more striking is 
the way the human and non-human bodies are arranged and related to each other. The heritage 
sites are described as a ‘part of who we are’, an ‘extension of ourselves’ without which people 
are ‘travellers without belongings’, ‘beings without soul’. The things and the persons are 
arranged and related as bodies on the same level; sometimes they are even described as merging 
and becoming the same body (‘part of who we are’, ‘extension of ourselves’). 
This arranging of bodies is not neutral. The way bodies are related and arranged makes 
listeners remember the affective intensity generated by the closeness to or distance from certain 
other bodies. Along with emotion attribution and emotionalizing metaphor, the relating and 
positioning of bodies is part of a rhetorical strategy to create an arrangement of bodies that feels 
plausible and within which the claims of certain normative statements appear just. If certain 
buildings are seen as bodies similar and close to ourselves, then the perpetrators are seen as 
bodies that we feel are not in the right position with their actions, while the victims are felt to 
                                                 
20 All quotations cited as ‘Trial Day 3 French’ are from the public transcript of the third day of the trial proceedings 
on 24 August 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-6-FRA ET WT 24-08-2016 1-76 NB T (translations from the French by 
the author). 




be in exactly the right position. In this case, it also feels just to punish the perpetrator and 
compensate the victims.  
After the prosecution had laid out its rhetoric, its specific version of sentimentalizing of 
persons and things, Bensouda uses it as a background for explicitly framing her argument in 
terms of affect and emotions: 
 
I ask all of us to imagine, if only for a second, what it must have felt like, then, on that 
fateful day in 2012, that fateful period, to witness the wanton destruction of this 
cherished cultural heritage, a deliberate assault on one’s identity, spiritual beliefs and 
prized cultural possessions (Trial Day 1: 20). 
 
This question, like all rhetorical questions, now answers itself. It must have felt horrible. The 
people of Timbuktu must have felt desperate and humiliated; the destruction of the mausoleums 
must have induced dismay and rage. And that is also what the victims are actually feeling – at 
least according to the rhetorical representation of the prosecution. This rhetorical question only 
works, however, because it is posed against the background of a specific form of 
sentimentalizing that has been brought about by carefully deployed rhetorical strategies. All 
bodies are arranged in the right way and distinguished from another in such a way that the 
punishment of the perpetrator feels just. Key to this arrangement of bodies is the elevated status 
of the destroyed objects. ‘Let us be clear’, Bensouda brings home her point in her opening 
statement, ‘what is at stake here is not just walls and stones’ (CoCH: 13). 
4.2 The Defence: ‘What Crime is More Grave: Blowing up Buildings or Shooting Down 
People?’ 
The prosecution’s strategies of sentimentalizing persons and things are of course designed to 
serve a specific purpose and are not the only ones possible. The defence is aiming for a different 
arrangement of bodies in which Al Mahdi’s actions appear in another light and in which the idea 
of punishing him is not felt as passionately.  
The rhetorical attribution of emotion can be found in the defence’s speech as well, but the 
emotions are attributed differently than by the prosecution. Mohamed Aouini, Al Mahdi’s lead 
defence lawyer from Tunisia, describes the emotional state of his client:21 ‘Mr Al Mahdi had no 
                                                 
21 Mohamed Aouini spoke in Arabic; the quotations are from the transcription of the English simultaneous 
translation. 




grudges, had no hatreds, had no ill feelings against any members of the community’ (Trial Day 
3: 36). This statement is an initial step towards refuting the prosecution’s claim that Al Mahdi 
destroyed the buildings out of hatred or rage. In other words, Al Mahdi’s feelings towards the 
buildings and the people attached to them were neither inappropriate nor in violation of the 
implied feelings rules. Moreover, the defence contends that the accused has ‘regret’ and 
‘remorse’ for his actions (Trial Day 3: 36) – feelings that are in accordance with the feeling rules 
expected in a situation where a confessed perpetrator tries to make up for what he has done. 
The qualities of the destroyed buildings as bodies are again at the centre of the argument. 
One of Al Mahdi’s defence lawyers, the Belgian Jean-Louis Gillisen, takes issue with Fatou 
Bensouda’s argument directly and declares, ‘There has been mens rea for – and this is not to 
reduce the scope of the crime – there has been mens rea for a crime against stones. But this shall 
not downplay anything in any way’ (Trial Day 3 French: 56). At this point, the key difference 
in the competing arrangements of bodies becomes visible: either the World Heritage sites are 
merely a collection of stones or they are something more, something much closer to humans. 
The defence must try its best to convince the court of the former, and therefore does not engage 
in any metaphorical rhetoric regarding the destroyed World Heritage buildings. The defence’s 
goal of attaining a more lenient sentence made it necessary to argue that the destroyed objects 
are not like human bodies, not the living incarnations the prosecution had argued – at least not 
to the same degree.  
When the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia heard the cases 
relating to the siege of Dubrovnik (an operation in which 114 persons, including many civilians, 
were killed and many buildings designated as UNESCO World Heritage were destroyed), it 
handed down sentences of between six and seven years’ imprisonment for the commanders of 
the attack – significantly less than the nine years the prosecution was demanding in the Al Mahdi 
case. Jean Gillisen, Al Mahdi’s lawyer, comments on this obvious disparity: 
 
In addition to the loss and destruction of cultural and religious values, as in this case, 
there were then also victims with severe injuries, permanent handicaps, and – as I said – 
also deaths: mourning families, wives who lost their husbands, husbands who lost their 
wives, children who will never see their parents again. All of this, we don’t have in this 
case. Yes, the crime is severe, but I call for reason, common sense, and moderation. At 
times today I had the impression that I was dealing with the opening of a concentration 
camp (Trial Day 3 French: 57-58). 
 




Gillisen argues instead for arranging the human and non-human bodies so that they are not so 
close to one another and, most importantly, not on the same level: 
 
There is a hierarchy of protected values. There is one supreme value. Is it necessary to 
repeat it here? It seems that I must. It is human life that supersedes all. That is the 
supreme value. … The question that presents itself can be summarized like this: What is 
more serious, … shattering objects or torturing humans, destroying walls or destroying 
lives, attacking buildings or attacking people? (Trial Day 3 French: 75). 
 
The sentimentalizing of persons and things by the defence is strikingly different from the 
prosecution’s. In the defence’s normative arrangement, human and non-human bodies are 
further apart from each other. The non-human bodies of the mausoleums are not described as 
animated (which would relate them more closely to human bodies). Human bodies are clearly 
elevated above non-human bodies to underline that they, for all intents and purposes, are more 
important and valuable than things. 
4.3 Representatives of the Victims: ‘By Attacking the Dead They Actually Attacked the 
Living’ 
In the Al Mahdi case, a third party also engages in the sentimentalizing of persons and things. 
The victim group came to the proceedings relatively late and was composed of several citizens 
of Timbuktu who, in one way or another, were involved with the destroyed buildings, whether 
as masons, pilgrims, or in some other capacity. Their desired normative arrangement of bodies 
was similar to the one the prosecution was keen to establish, although there were also marked 
differences.  
The representative of the victims, the Congolese lawyer Kassongo Mayombo, also engages 
in attributing emotion, most strikingly by questioning the sincerity of Al Mahdi’s apology two 
days before. He asks, ‘Is it sincere and does if flow from a genuine desire to repair the prejudice 
arising from the crimes?’ (Trial Day 3 French: 30). He presents this question to dismiss the 
defendant’s claim that he feels in accordance with the expected feeling rules, that is, regretful 
and remorseful.  
In reference to his clients he attributes emotions similar to those mentioned by the 
prosecution and in line with what is implicitly expected from them. He describes them as 
‘depressed’ (abattu), having ‘vertigo’ (avoir des vertiges), and ‘feeling powerless’ (rester 
impuissant), and he reports of ‘their shame and suffering’ (leur honte et leur souffrance) (Trial 




Day 3 French: 20–21). He also deploys emotionalizing metaphors similar to the prosecution to 
describe the destroyed buildings: 22 ‘Timbuktu is not only a mass of stones and tombs, a resting 
place for 333 saints and other mausoleums; it is indeed an incarnation of African civilization 
and its grandeur. Timbuktu is an incarnation of African Islamic intelligence and the science, 
philosophy, and spirituality it has developed’ (Trial Day 3 French: 25). 
What differs markedly from the prosecution’s normative arrangement of bodies is that 
Kassongo introduces a third kind of body into the courtroom. Not only are human bodies and 
the bodies of the mausoleums as things arranged and related to each other, but the dead ancestors 
whose graves had been attacked are also brought into the equation: ‘By attacking the dead, Mr 
Al Mahdi and his group actually attacked the living’ (Trial Day 3 French: 22). In this normative 
arrangement, different kinds of bodies – the persons, the buildings, and the dead – are arranged 
in a way that they are similar and close to each other: attacking the dead means attacking the 
living.  
The victims’ emotions are at the centre of their claim that their rights had been violated. 
The mausoleums were not their property, but their emotional attachment connected and related 
them to the World Heritage buildings. The violation of their religious feelings coincides with 
the violation of their rights: ‘Mr President, your Honours, it is the victims’ sentiment I want to 
bring to your attention: the sentiment that things are irreparable, the sentiment of suffering that 
has brought them to shouting and crying rather than to praying’ (Trial Day 3 French: 27). 
4.4 The Chamber: ‘A War Activity Aimed at Breaking the Soul of the People of Timbuktu’ 
For the destruction of buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments, Ahmad Al Mahdi 
was found guilty of war crimes according to Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute and sentenced 
to nine years in prison. In the judgment and sentencing hearing on 27 September 2016, the 
judges engaged in a sentimentalizing of their own. In the proceedings, they had been presented 
with very different normative arrangements of bodies that were designed to prompt very 
different assessments of the degree of Al Mahdi’s guilt. One either evaluates Al Mahdi’s actions 
within an arrangement in which buildings are inanimate bodies – inherently different from and 
of less worth than human bodies – whose destruction will not and should not be felt as deeply 
                                                 
22 There is an indigenous tradition in West Africa of anthropomorphizing architecture (Prussin 1974, 1986), which 
indicates that there is a pre-colonial practice of normatively arranging bodies in such a way that certain buildings 
are highly valued. It is important to clarify that sentimentalizing is not unique to the International Criminal Court 
or the World Heritage Regime of UNESCO, and cannot, even in this context, be easily dismissed as a ‘Western’ 
or (neo-)colonial imposition. I tend to argue that sentimentalizing is an integral part of many different processes 
of meaning-making. 




as the loss of persons, or one evaluates Al Mahdi’s action within an arrangement in which these 
mausoleums are in a way animate bodies like humans, incarnating the collective identity of the 
people of Timbuktu (and of all of humankind) such that their destruction should be felt as deeply 
as the loss of persons. Depending on how the relevant bodies are affectively arranged and how 
the emotions are distributed among them, the degree of the accused’s guilt will be assessed 
radically differently.  
Consequently, the judges commented on the normative arrangement of bodies that 
underpinned their judgment. They directly addressed the relationship of human and non-human 
bodies by clarifying: 
 
As regards the gravity requirement, the Chamber first notes that, unlike other accused 
convicted by this Court, Mr Al Mahdi is not charged with crimes against persons but 
with a crime against property. In the view of the Chamber, even if inherently grave, 
crimes against property are generally of a lesser gravity than crimes against persons 
(JSH: 11). 
 
In the Court’s sentimentalizing, human and non-human bodies are clearly arranged in a 
hierarchical way. However, human bodies and the destroyed buildings are related to each other 
by attributing emotions to them. The Chamber considered ‘that the fact that the targeted 
buildings … had a symbolic and emotional value for the inhabitants of Timbuktu is relevant in 
assessing the gravity of the crime committed’ (JSH: 12).  
Key to the Court’s relational positioning of bodies is that they see the human and non-
human bodies connected by ‘an emotional attachment’ (JSH: 12). The population of Mali 
‘considered Timbuktu as a source of pride’ and ‘were indignant to see these acts take place’ 
(JSH: 12). Because of these affective relations and emotional attachments, ‘the entire 
international community, in the belief that heritage is part of cultural life, is suffering as a result 
of the destruction of the protected sites’ (JSH: 12). 
The Chamber produced yet another version of sentimentalizing persons and things, a 
version that had to engage with and react to – at least to some degree – the sentimentalizing of 
the various parties. The judges ultimately produced a normative arrangement of bodies that 
clearly differentiates between persons and things, but sees them as closely connected by an 
emotional attachment; breaking this attachment in an armed conflict constitutes a war crime.  





Some bodies (be they human or non-human) are dearer, more important, and more valuable to 
us than others. In some cases, the destruction of certain bodies is considered an act so heinous 
that it qualifies as one of ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as 
a whole’. The perpetrator of such a crime has to answer before the International Criminal Court. 
Which bodies are that dear, that important, and that valuable for all of humanity is obviously 
not dependent on the question of whether those bodies are human or not. Such an assessment 
and the legal process that brings it about seem to be far more complex. I have argued in this 
article that determining the meaning of persons and things as a basis for assessing the severity 
of a crime is embedded in a process of legal meaning-making that I have called sentimentalizing 
persons and things.  
As has become clear, in the courtroom (and, of course, outside of it) there will never be 
only one normative arrangement that governs all the meaning-making regarding the value of 
different bodies. All parties in a debate engage in sentimentalizing and compete to impress upon 
the court the most plausible frame for assessing guilt or innocence, justice or injustice. 
Examining the process of meaning-making in the courtroom with a focus on the attribution of 
emotion and the semantic arrangement of bodies opens an analytical space to explore why some 
facts, some stories, some versions of reality are more plausible to some actors than others and 
why, therefore, certain legal outcomes and certain punishments for a crime feel more justified 
than others. Including affect and emotion in the analysis of courtroom performance can be a 
way to add an important dimension to exploring the categories of plausibility, legal decision, 
and perception of justice. 
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